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The Next Frontier in Central
Bank Transparency?
By George A. Kahn
I
n the last two decades, central banks have taken a variety of steps to
increase the transparency of monetary policy. For example, most
central banks now provide regular reports on recent economic devel-
opments, the stance of monetary policy, and the outlook for inflation
and other goal variables. In addition, a number of central banks have
adopted explicit numerical inflation targets.  
Today, many economists are suggesting ways to further increase
transparency, and central bankers are considering further steps. One area
of considerable interest is the outlook for the future path of the policy
rate. The policy rate is the short-term, typically overnight, interest rate
that central bankers use to adjust the stance of monetary policy. While
central banks typically announce changes in the policy rate when they
occur, very few central banks provide an explicit description of where
the policy rate is likely to be set in the future.    
Yet this information is clearly of value to financial markets. Financial
market participants want to know the policy path, so they can properly
price long-term assets, such as government notes and bonds, which
depend in part on future short rates. In addition, speculation about the
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outlook for the policy rate is a staple of the financial press, and futures
markets have developed to allow investors to hedge risk or speculate
about future policy moves. More information about the policy path
might make these markets more efficient and reduce asset price volatility. 
This article surveys current central bank practices and identifies
some of the conceptual and practical issues that may limit central banks’
ability and willingness to provide more information about the policy
path to financial markets. The first section of the article defines the
policy path and describes alternative approaches to constructing the
path. The second section discusses the pros and cons of formulating a
policy path and communicating it to the public. The third section
reviews the current practices in a number of central banks. The fourth
section identifies a number of practical issues that make providing such
information a challenge.
I.  WHAT IS THE POLICY PATH AND HOW IS 
IT CONSTRUCTED?
Today, most central banks conduct monetary policy by exerting
control over the policy rate—a short-term interest rate such as the
overnight federal funds rate. This control over the policy rate gives the
central bank considerable influence over short-term market interest
rates. In addition, central banks seek to influence longer-term interest
rates by influencing market expectations about the future stance of
monetary policy. They do this by communicating information to the
public about their long-run objectives, their outlook for economic activ-
ity and inflation and, to varying degrees, their assessment of the future
course of the policy rate. Financial market participants, in turn, use this
information to price financial assets such as Treasury securities. 
While most central banks seek to influence market expectations of
the future course of monetary policy, to date, very few central banks for-
mulate or communicate an explicit path for the policy rate. In fact, the
concept of a policy path is relatively new. This section describes what a
policy path is and how it might be constructed.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2007 27
What is a policy path?
A policy path is the sequence of current and expected future settings
of the policy rate that central bankers believe will be consistent with
achieving their goals. Along the policy path, the policy rate will not gen-
erally be constant but rather may rise or fall over time based on current
and expected future economic conditions. For example, if policymakers
expect inflation pressures to build over the next year or two, they may
believe the policy rate will need to be raised over the next several quarters.
If so, the policy path would slope upward. In addition, the entire policy
path itself may change over time with the arrival of new information that
changes the outlook for economic activity and inflation. 
Currently, most central banks do not formulate an explicit policy
path or communicate one to the public. Most central banks instead
focus primarily on the current setting of the policy rate. They commu-
nicate their decisions about the current policy rate to the public, along
with information about the rationale for policy decisions, the outlook
for economic activity and inflation, and the objectives of monetary
policy. While some central banks provide qualitative information about
the expected path of the policy rate in the future—for example, whether
the policy rate is more likely to rise or fall in the foreseeable future—
most stop short of communicating an explicit numerical path. 
Even though central banks may not formulate an explicit policy
path, financial market participants must anticipate future policy rates
when pricing financial assets. The expectations theory of the term struc-
ture of interest rates provides a model for understanding how the
market’s view of the policy path influences interests rates of different
maturities. In the expectations theory, the interest rate on any govern-
ment security can be viewed as an average of today’s policy rate and the
policy rates that financial market participants expect to prevail over the
life of the security, plus a term premium.
1 For example, today’s one-year
rate can be thought of as an average of today’s policy rate and the
sequence of policy rates investors expect over the next year, plus a term
premium. Similarly, today’s five-year rate can be thought of as an average
of the policy rates expected over the next five years, plus a term premium. 28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Under the expectations theory, interest rates change when investors
believe the future path of the policy rate will be changed. For example,
suppose investors change their expectation for future policy from a con-
stant path for the policy rate to a path in which the policy rate rises by
50 basis points in six months and remains there. The six-month rate
would remain unchanged since the policy rate increase is not expected
to take place for six months. In contrast, the six-month rate six months
in the future would increase by the full 50 basis points. And, the one-
year rate would increase by 25 basis points, the average of the increase in
the current six-month rate (zero basis points) and the increase in the six-
month rate expected six months from now (50 basis points).
2
Information from financial markets can be used to estimate market
participants’ view of the policy path. One approach is to use informa-
tion from financial futures markets, such as federal funds futures or
eurodollar futures. Another approach is to use data from the term struc-
ture of interest rates to estimate expected future rates on securities.
3 Yet
another approach is to survey market participants directly on their
expectations about future monetary policy actions. It is important to
note, however, that a policy path constructed in this manner represents
the financial market’s perception of the policy path and that this per-
ceived path may or may not be consistent with the policy path in the
minds of policymakers. To the extent the market views the outlook for
economic activity and inflation differently from the central bank or
lacks a full understanding of the goals and strategies of monetary policy,
the market’s expected policy path may differ from the policymaker’s
view of the policy path. 
How might a policy path be constructed?
Policymakers can, in theory, construct an explicit policy path using a
model of the economy and an explicit policy objective function. The
model of the economy describes how the economy operates and, in par-
ticular, defines how monetary policy influences economic activity and
inflation. The objective function identifies the goals of monetary policy
and the preferences of policymakers when tradeoffs exist among multiple
goals (appendix). Typically, most model-based approaches to construct-
ing a policy path assume the goals of monetary policy are to minimizeECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2007 29
the variability of inflation around an inflation target and output around
its potential level.
4 Policymakers can construct a policy path by optimiz-
ing this objective function subject to their model of the economy.    
In theory, if the public has access to the same information as poli-
cymakers about the state of the economy and knows their model,
policymakers could reveal the policy path by communicating their
objective function to the public. This could involve policymakers com-
municating to the public an explicit numerical objective for inflation, an
explicit estimate of the economy’s potential level of real output, as well
as explicit parameters governing their willingness to trade off inflation
stability for output stability.
5 Policymakers would need to convey this
information to the public through both their communications and their
actions. The public could then solve the same optimization problem
faced by the central bank and arrive at the same policy path. 
In practice, implementing such an approach could prove difficult or
impossible. The model of the economy may be large and complex,
requiring the policy path to depend on detailed information about the
state of the economy. Model parameters and structure may change over
time. Policymakers may use judgment to incorporate information from
outside the model into the determination of the optimal policy path.
Communicating these parameter changes and judgmental adjustments
may be difficult. And market participants may lack the information
required to compute the central bank’s optimal policy path. 
Recognizing these difficulties, policymakers might instead choose to
set policy according to a relatively simple rule. Under such a procedure,
policymakers would specify, and commit to following, a formula for
setting the policy rate in response to either current economic conditions
or expected conditions at some point in the future (appendix). Typically,
such a rule would not incorporate all contingencies and, therefore, at best,
would only approximate the setting of the policy rate that follows from
optimization of an objective function subject to a complex model of the
economy. However, the approach has the advantage of making clear how
the policy rate responds to deviations in goal variables from target.
Policymakers could communicate the policy rule to the public along
with their forecast for output and inflation. Market participants could
then construct the policy path without knowing the policymakers’
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forecast for inflation and output at any future point in time into a
formula describing the policy rule and derive the corresponding policy
rate expected for that date. But, in practice, no central bank has been
willing to commit to, and communicate to the public, an explicit policy
rule—much less communicate its policy goals in the form of an explicit
objective function.
Under these circumstances, a possible alternative approach would be
for the central bank to determine its policy path and, rather than expect
the public to infer it from an objective function or a policy rule, simply
communicate it directly to the public. In other words, the central bank
could announce an explicit sequence of expected future policy rate set-
tings. Policymakers would also need to communicate their forecast for
inflation and output expected to be consistent with the policy path. In
this way, the public could verify that the policy path was consistent with
the stated objectives of policymakers. Furthermore, to communicate the
uncertainty associated with the explicit policy path, policymakers might
also want to provide a description of the range of uncertainty surround-
ing it or provide a range of alternative paths that correspond to a variety
of alternative economic scenarios. 
II.  PROS AND CONS OF COMMUNICATING A 
POLICY PATH
Formulating and communicating an explicit policy path to the
public carries with it both potential benefits and drawbacks. Determin-
ing the net benefit is difficult given central banks’ limited experience to
date in communicating a policy path. This is especially true in assessing
the marginal benefit of an explicit policy path when other transparency-
enhancing measures have already been put in place. 
Pros
A number of potential benefits arise from communicating an
explicit policy path. First, communicating a policy path could enhance
monetary policy transparency. In a democracy with an independent
central bank, transparency provides a means of accountability. Trans-
parency allows the public to judge whether the central bank’s goals are
aligned with the public’s interests and whether the central bank’s actionsECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2007 31
are consistent with its goals. Providing information about the policy-
makers’ expected future path for the policy rate gives the public a means
to evaluate the consistency of policy plans with policy goals. This, in
turn, helps hold monetary policymakers accountable for their actions. 
Second, communicating an explicit policy path may help demon-
strate policymakers’ commitment to achieving long-run goals. For
example, if policymakers announce a commitment to lower inflation
from an unacceptably high level, that commitment may be more credi-
ble if policymakers simultaneously announce the policy path they expect
will be required to achieve that inflation objective. In addition, once the
inflation objective and policy path are announced, reneging on either
commitment may become more difficult.
6 To the extent that communi-
cating a policy path helps anchor long-run inflation expectations,
temporary shocks to inflation are less likely to be built into wage- and
price-setting behavior. This, in turn, will lead to greater stability in the
macro economy.
Third, announcing a policy path may help financial market partici-
pants more efficiently price assets. For example, while an explicit
inflation objective helps anchor long-run inflation expectations and,
therefore, long-run nominal interest rates, considerable uncertainty may
still surround the near-term outlook. One source of uncertainty about
the near-term outlook is the outlook for monetary policy. Policymakers
can reduce this near-term uncertainty by communicating a path for the
policy rate. This, in turn, may lead to lower volatility of asset prices.
However, uncertainty about the policy path will not be completely elim-
inated because the policy path will change over time with the arrival of
new and unexpected information about the state of the economy. 
Fourth, announcing a policy path may give policymakers greater
leverage over long-term interest rates. According to the expectations
theory of the term structure, medium- and long-term interest rates are
an average of the current and expected future policy rate. For example, if
policymakers credibly communicate an intention to keep the policy rate
higher for a longer period of time than financial markets currently
expect, medium-term to long-term interest rates would likely be higher
than if policymakers communicate only their current target for the
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Thus, the communication of the policy path might give monetary
policy more “bang for the buck,” allowing longer-term rates to react not
only to the current setting of the policy rate, but also to expected future
actions. Medium- and long-term rates might react faster and further
when a policy action is accompanied by communication of a complete
policy path. To the extent that medium- and long-term rates have a
greater influence than short-term rates over economic activity and infla-
tion, monetary policy actions would be more potent. This greater
potency of policy would be especially beneficial if policymakers want to
limit short-run interest rate volatility. Small changes in the policy rate
that are expected to persist for a long time would have the same effect on
longer-term rates as larger, more transitory changes in the policy rate.
7 
Finally, evidence from macroeconomic theory suggests that provid-
ing information about the policy path when the public does not have
full information about the policymakers’ objective function or policy
rule can improve macroeconomic performance. Rudebusch and
Williams examine the effect of providing information about the policy
path to private agents who do not know the parameters of the policy
rule and therefore must estimate them from past policy actions. They
show that providing information about the policy path helps private
agents estimate the policy rule and, by aligning the public’s and central
bank’s expectations of future policy rates, noticeably reduces fluctuations
in output and inflation. Rudebusch and Williams also show the value of
providing information about the policy path when the public is uncer-
tain about the central bank’s inflation objective. Again, information
about the policy path helps align public and central bank expectations
about future monetary policy and facilitates the economy’s convergence
back to the inflation objective after a shock.
8
Cons
First and most basically, most central banks have no explicit policy
path to communicate. While policymakers may have a sense of the
direction of future policy rate changes, in most cases they have not tried
to reach agreement on an explicit future path. To communicate a policy
path, policymakers in many central banks would need to change their
procedures to focus, not just on the current setting of the policy rate,
but on the entire policy path. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2007 33
Second, policymakers may be concerned that financial markets and
the public will view an explicit policy path as an unconditional commit-
ment as opposed to a plan that is subject to change. This could cause
financial markets to respond more sluggishly than warranted to new
information that changes the outlook for economic activity and infla-
tion. When financial market participants eventually recognize that the
policy path has changed, they may feel misled by the central bank.
9 To
some extent, policymakers could mitigate this concern by providing
ranges around the central policy path, or they could communicate alter-
native scenarios that would call for alternative paths. However, there
may still be a concern that market participants would focus too heavily
on the midpoint of the policy path’s confidence range or on the central
bank’s baseline scenario for the policy path.
Third, communicating an explicit policy path may make policymak-
ers less willing to change their policy path in light of new information.
Policymakers may be concerned that a frequent updating of the policy
path might undermine the public’s confidence in their forecasting ability
or in their commitment to follow through on announced plans. This
could lead to a policy path that is not fully updated over time with the
arrival of new information and is therefore suboptimal. 
Policymakers may be particularly concerned about this issue when
they contemplate reversing the direction of a previously communicated
policy path. For example, when policy turns from an accommodative to
a restrictive stance, the policy path may turn suddenly from downward
sloping or steady to upward sloping. Policymakers may be concerned
that financial markets will overreact to such a shift in policy, leading to
excessive financial market volatility.
10
Fourth, at times, there may simply be too much fundamental
uncertainty, complexity, and change in the economic environment to
form a policy path with any confidence. Geopolitical events or financial
market crises may cloud the near-term outlook. Structural change
driven by technology, globalization, and financial innovation may be so
pervasive that economic models based on the past become unreliable.
Uncertainty about the structure and parameters of economic models call
into question the dependability of model-based forecasts and policy pre-
scriptions. Objective functions may be far more complex than can be
captured in a simple expression with fixed parameters. These uncertain-
ties may make policymakers cautious in communicating their views of
future economic conditions and the future policy path. 34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
An example of a period of unusual uncertainty about future eco-
nomic conditions occurred in March 2003 in the days leading up to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the statement released after its March 18
meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—the Federal
Reserve’s principal monetary policymaking body—indicated that “In
light of the unusually large uncertainties clouding the geopolitical situa-
tion in the short run and their apparent effects on economic
decision-making, the Committee does not believe it can usefully charac-
terize the current balance of risks with respect to the prospects for its
long-run goals of price stability and sustainable growth. Rather, the
Committee decided to refrain from making that determination until
some of those uncertainties abate….”
Finally, the marginal benefit of providing an explicit numerical
policy path to the markets may be small given the many other steps
central banks have taken to increase transparency. Many banks already
provide qualitative guidance about the policy path, and most provide
forecasts of inflation and economic activity. Many banks also provide
explicit numerical targets for inflation. Given sufficient clarity about the
goals of policy, the outlook for economic activity, and perhaps some qual-
itative guidance about the outlook for future policy, there may be little or
no net benefit from announcing an explicit numerical policy path. 
Moreover, announcing an explicit path for the policy rate may not
always be effective in influencing financial market participants’ views of
the likely path of monetary policy. This situation might arise when
financial market participants have a different outlook for economic
activity and inflation than the central bank. In late 2006, for example,
the FOMC highlighted in its post-meeting statements an upside risk to
inflation, suggesting that a future policy rate increase was more likely
than a decrease. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the federal funds futures
market and the Treasury yield curve, financial markets expected the next
policy move was more likely to be a rate decrease.
11
In sum, the net benefits of announcing an explicit policy path are
uncertain, and different central banks may assess them differently. As a
result, central banks have taken a variety of approaches to communicat-
ing information about the future outlook for monetary policy. The next
section examines these different approaches by surveying the current
practices of a number of central banks in developed economies. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2007 35
III.  A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES
To date, only two developed-economy central banks—the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank, the central bank of
Norway—formulate and communicate an explicit policy path.
12 The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, for example, provides quarterly projec-
tions of key macroeconomic variables using an endogenously determined
policy path. All of the projections are derived from an economic model
with the policy path determined by a rule that is subject to judgmental
adjustment by the policymaker. Likewise, the Norges Bank publishes
forecasts of macroeconomic variables three times a year with the policy
rate similarly determined by a judgmentally adjusted policy rule.
All other central banks communicate information about the
outlook for monetary policy more indirectly. One approach is to
provide forecasts of goal variables under an interest rate assumption that
may differ from the central bank’s most likely policy path. Another
approach is to provide qualitative guidance about the likely policy path
through official statements and minutes from policy meetings, other
regular reports, public speeches and official testimony of policymakers,
and, in some cases, press conferences.
Central bank forecasts
As shown in Table 1, all of the surveyed central banks provide infor-
mation to the public about their outlook for inflation and economic
activity but condition their forecasts on different interest rate assumptions.
Key macroeconomic variables that are forecast include inflation, output,
and, in some cases, unemployment. Central banks provide these forecasts
at frequencies ranging from two to four times a year over forecast horizons
ranging from one to four years. While the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Norges Bank provide “unconditional” forecasts based on the
expected policy path, other banks either condition their forecasts on an
explicit interest rate assumption or provide forecasts without spelling out
the precise interest rate path on which they are based.  
Banks that provide an explicit interest rate assumption other than
the policy path itself typically take one of two approaches. The first
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remains constant at its current level over the forecast horizon. This
approach has the advantage of not presuming any future change in the
policy rate and, therefore, reduces the chances that the public might
view the constant interest rate assumption as the policy path. Yet, at the
same time, the public can infer information about the policy path by
comparing the central bank’s forecast for goal variables, under the
assumption of no change in the policy rate, with the central bank’s
objectives for goal variables. If under a constant interest rate assumption,
a central bank forecasts that its goal variables will deviate from their
objective, it is likely that the implied policy path will deviate from the
assumed constant rate path in a predictable direction. 
How the public might formulate an estimate of the policy path
would depend on whether and how the central bank’s forecasts of its
goal variables deviate from the central bank’s objectives. For example, if
inflation is forecast to exceed its objective over the forecast horizon
under a constant interest rate assumption, it is likely that the central
bank’s implicit policy path will have an upward trajectory over the near
term. Similarly, if the interest rate assumption leads to lower-than-
desired inflation, the central bank’s implicit policy path will likely
involve lower rates, at least in the near term.
Basing projections on an unchanged policy rate, however, has a
number of disadvantages. It would rarely be consistent with the histori-
cal behavior of policymakers and would, therefore, be inconsistent with
a macro model that is based on historical behavioral patterns. If the
policy rate is held constant at an unusually high or low level for a pro-
longed period, projections of output and inflation could drift off to
historically unprecedented levels. The central bank may find itself pub-
lishing forecasts that fall outside historic norms and that fail to achieve
policy objectives over the forecast horizon. The approach also incorpo-
rates an assumption about monetary policy that policymakers
themselves do not likely believe. 
The second approach to forecasting goal variables is to assume the
policy rate follows the financial market’s expectations for interest rates as
implied by market data or surveys of market participants. The European
Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan, Sweden’s Riksbank, and the
Bank of England currently take this approach.
13 Like the constant rate
assumption, this approach allows the public to infer information about38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
the likely policy path by observing whether and how a central bank’s
projections diverge from its stated objectives. For example, the central
bank’s forecast of inflation under the assumption of the financial
market’s expected interest rate path may produce an inflation forecast
that is higher than the bank’s inflation objective. If so, the public can
infer that the policy path will likely require higher rates than the market
currently expects, at least in the near term. If inflation is lower than the
objective, the public can infer that the policy path will require lower
rates than the market is currently expecting, at least in the near term. 
Basing projections on the market’s expectations of future policy
rates may have some advantages over the constant interest rate assump-
tion. The approach allows interest rates to adjust according to the
financial market’s view of how monetary policy has behaved historically.
As a result, the approach is more historically consistent and less likely to
produce forecasts outside historic norms. On the other hand, the
approach may give the appearance that market expectations drive mon-
etary policy, rather than policy driving market expectations. And, if the
market’s expectations differ from those of policymakers, they will still
result in projections that do not reflect policymakers’ own view of the
most likely outcome for goal variables. If market expectations for policy
rates do not match those of policymakers, there may be value in the pol-
icymaker informing the market of the discrepancy rather than
reinforcing it. 
Other central banks, including the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
Bank of Canada, and the Federal Reserve, provide forecasts of key
macroeconomic variables but do not reveal the explicit numerical
assumption for the policy rate on which their forecasts are based. In the
case of the Federal Reserve, projections of key variables are based on
each FOMC member’s view of “appropriate” monetary policy. While an
explicit policy path is not communicated to the public, each member of
the committee must have in mind a policy path that underlies his or her
semiannual projections. Therefore, to determine the range of policy
paths underlying the FOMC’s projections, the public would need to
know each FOMC member’s individual policy path. And each
member’s policy path would, in turn, depend on each member’s model
of the economy, their judgment about the outlook, and their explicit
objectives for monetary policy.
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Qualitative guidance
Besides the information about the policy path that can be discerned
from central bank forecasts, qualitative information about the future path
of monetary policy is frequently conveyed through official statements,
the minutes of policy committee meetings, and other reports. The
Federal Reserve has been at the forefront of central banks that have pro-
vided such qualitative guidance through their public communications. 
Since May 1999, the FOMC has issued an explanatory statement
immediately after each of its meetings. These statements have, over
time, provided guidance about the likely policy path. For example, for
several meetings in 1999, the Committee indicated not only the current
setting for the policy rate but also the likely direction of any change in
the policy rate that might occur before the next scheduled meeting.
15
Because of concern about what was viewed as outsized market
responses to these statements, in 2000 the FOMC changed the language
in its statements to reflect the risks to the achievement of its goal vari-
ables rather than a description of the likely direction of a future change
in the policy rate. These statements continued to provide information
about the likely policy path in the sense that the risks to the achieve-
ment of the FOMC’s goals could often be translated into an outlook for
future policy. For example, in February 2000 the Committee indicated
that it “believes the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that
may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable future.”
With risks weighted toward “heightened inflation pressures,” the state-
ment could be read as suggesting a policy path in which a policy rate
increase was more likely than a rate decrease. Similarly, in the August
2002 statement, risks that “are weighted mainly toward conditions that
may generate economic weakness” could be read as suggesting a policy
path in which a future rate decrease was more likely than a rate increase. 
In 2003, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low prompted
the FOMC again to provide more direct guidance about the policy
path. In its August statement, the Committee indicated it “believes that
policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period,”
suggesting that the policy rate was likely to remain at a historically low
level for an unusually long time. Then, in January 2004, the Committee
said it “believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommo-40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
dation.” Finally, as the committee contemplated raising its policy rate
later that year, it said it “believes that policy accommodation can be
removed at a pace that is likely to be measured,” suggesting a gradual
upward trajectory for the policy path.
Other central banks have been somewhat less willing to provide
verbal guidance about their policy path. Instead, they have tended to
focus more directly on risks to their key objectives, leaving the markets
to interpret any possible implication of these risks for policy rates. There
have, however, been exceptions. For example, the Bank of Japan indi-
cated in 1999 its intention to maintain its policy rate at zero “until
deflationary concerns are dispelled.” And, in 2006, the Bank of Canada
indicated in its policy statements that “some modest further increase in
the policy interest rate may be required to keep aggregate supply and
demand in balance and inflation on target over the medium term”
(Rudebusch and Williams, pp. 7-8).
Why don’t more central banks communicate an explicit policy path?
The next section takes up this question, describing some of the chal-
lenges that make communicating a policy path to the public problematic.  
IV.  PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
Because the net benefits are uncertain and subject to interpretation,
other factors may drive the decision to formulate and communicate an
explicit policy path. Some monetary policy strategies may lend them-
selves more naturally than others to an explicit policy path. In addition,
the structure of the decision-making process may influence the feasibil-
ity of formulating and communicating a policy path. 
Monetary policy strategies
Although the net benefits of formulating and communicating an
explicit numerical policy path are uncertain, as suggested above, a few
central banks, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the
Norges Bank, have adopted strategies for monetary policy in which
policy paths are explicitly formulated and communicated to the public.
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One feature that might make use of an explicit policy path more
appealing is the framework of inflation targeting under which these
banks operate. While not unique to these banks, the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand was a pioneer in conducting monetary policy under an
inflation targeting regime (Table 1). It has also been a pioneer in com-
municating its policy path. The Norges Bank is also an inflation
targeter, although it has used its own forecast of the policy path in fore-
casting inflation and output only since March 2005. 
Under an inflation targeting regime, the central bank announces an
explicit numerical inflation target and typically indicates a timeframe for
achieving it. In many cases, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Norges Bank, the inflation objective is given to the central bank
by the government.
16 In addition, the central bank issues regular infla-
tion reports which present the bank’s official forecast for inflation. 
Relative to other monetary policy strategies, an inflation targeting
regime may be more conducive to formulating and communicating a
policy path. As discussed above, inflation forecasts are necessarily based
on an interest rate path. And the only model-consistent interest rate
path is one in which the policy path is endogenously determined. The
establishment of a numerical inflation target makes it easier to use an
economic model and a policy rule to determine an optimal policy path.
Still, even most inflation targeting banks do not communicate an
explicit policy path to the public. One reason, in addition to the cons
discussed earlier, may be related to the structure of decision-making in
most central banks and, in particular, whether a single decision-maker
or a committee is responsible for monetary policy. 
Structure of decision-making
A single decision-maker could arguably formulate and communicate
a policy path more easily than a committee. The decision-maker could
choose the policy path that optimizes his or her objective function given
his or her model of the economy. He or she could communicate directly
to the public with one voice. An example of a central bank that fits the
single decision-maker model is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Together with its well-established inflation targeting regime, the Reserve
Bank’s single decision-maker model may facilitate to some extent the for-
mulation and communication of a policy path. 
Most central banks, however, do not have a single decision-maker.
Decisions are made instead by a monetary policy committee. In contrast
to a single decision-maker structure, a committee may find it more dif-
ficult to formulate a policy path because committee members are likely
to subscribe to different models of the economy and, possibly, hold dif-
ferent views about the objective function. Even when an explicit
inflation objective is given to the policymakers by the government, com-
mittee members may disagree about the weight to place on stabilizing
inflation around its target relative to stabilizing output. 
Nevertheless, the diversity of views and information held by commit-
tee members, as well as a more deliberative approach to decision-making,
arguably may result in better decisions. Blinder identifies the advantages
of a committee structure as stemming from the different and idiosyn-
cratic information held by individual committee members, the checks
and balances that a committee imposes on individuals with strong politi-
cal views, the pooling of information from members subscribing to
different models of the economy, the advantage of combining individual
forecasts, and the ability of committees to take advantage of members’
diverse decision-making methods.
17
To exploit these advantages, any committee must establish ground
rules for decision-making. Members have to come to a consensus on
some issues while allowing differences of views on other issues. At one
extreme, a committee can seek agreement on all aspects of the policy-
making process. At the other extreme, a committee can seek agreement
or consensus just on its current policy stance and, potentially, on the
policy path. Under the former approach, a committee would need to
reach a common understanding of the goals of policy, the model or
models to be used in forecasting the economy, and the determinants of
policy actions. In such a decision-making process, actual and expected
policy actions would typically follow directly from the prior consensus.
While reaching consensus on an objective function and model may be
difficult, once a consensus is achieved, a policy path might be relatively
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At the other extreme, a committee might attempt to achieve consen-
sus on the policy path without necessarily agreeing on the precise goals of
policy or the model used in forecasting. But achieving a consensus on the
entire future path for the policy rate is a far more difficult decision-
making process than simply deciding the current setting of the policy
rate. While a voting mechanism might be designed that would determine
a policy path, each committee member might have very different reasons
for adopting any particular policy position.
18 This diversity of views
might make communicating the rationale for the policy path to the
public difficult. The public would need to interpret each member’s posi-
tion to assess the likely future consensus of the committee and the likely
course of policy. But averaging across a diversity of views may take greater
advantage of the benefits of a committee structure. 
Committee size is another dimension along which monetary policy
committees differ. Currently, they range in size from three members at
the Swiss National Bank to 19 members at the ECB (Table 1). The
Federal Reserve’s FOMC is also a relatively large committee with 12
members and 19 participants. In a large and diverse economy, it may be
important for the central bank to take into account information from a
wide range of regions and industries and from a variety of economic per-
spectives. A larger committee may make it easier to incorporate diverse
sources of information into the decision-making process. In addition, in
a large and diverse economy, a committee may require representation
from many regions to help maintain trust in the central bank and
support for its independence. 
On the other hand, academic research suggests there may be a trade-
off between the greater access to information of a large committee and a
number of coordination and incentive problems that increase with com-
mittee size. For example, larger committees may be subject to a free-rider
problem. Individual members’ efforts may decrease with group size,
unless their individual contribution can be identified and evaluated. In
addition, large committees can be subject to “group think” (Sibert). 
On balance, large and diverse economies such as the United States
or the Euro area may require monetary policy committees that are large
and more diverse. This may make achieving consensus on an explicit
policy path more difficult. Smaller monetary policy committees in
smaller and more homogeneous economies may find achieving consen-
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In short, while a committee structure may improve decision-making
through the diversity of its members, it may make formulating and
communicating a policy path more difficult. In the end, other consider-
ations may dominate—such as the concern that a policy path might be
viewed as an unconditional commitment, the view that qualitative guid-
ance is sufficient, and the belief that the net benefits of communicating
an explicit policy path are small and uncertain. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
Formulating and communicating a policy path have been advocated
as the next frontier in monetary policy transparency. A policy path can
be formulated by using an economic model to choose the path for the
policy rate that optimizes the policymakers’ objective function. The path
can be communicated indirectly by providing the public detailed infor-
mation about the objective function and economic model, or by
providing detailed information about the policymakers’ policy rule and
their forecast for goal variables. Alternatively and more practically, the
path can be communicated directly as a projection over the relevant
planning horizon of the policy rate itself. 
A number of possible benefits might be associated with communi-
cating the central bank’s policy path. First, announcing a policy path
may increase transparency and accountability by providing the public a
means to determine whether policymakers’ plans are consistent with
their objectives. Second, announcing a policy path may help anchor
long-run inflation expectations, leading to greater stability in the macro
economy. Third, announcing a policy path may help financial market
participants price medium- and long-run financial assets more effi-
ciently, reducing financial market volatility. Finally, announcing a policy
path may give policymakers greater leverage over medium- to long-run
interest rates. 
On the other hand, communicating an explicit policy path may
have some drawbacks. Potential issues include concern that the public
will take a policy path as an unconditional commitment rather than a
plan, concern that announcing a policy path will make policymakers less
willing to change policy in light of new information, and skepticism
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tainty, and change inherent in modern economies. In addition, given
the steps that central banks have already taken to increase transparency,
the marginal benefit of announcing an explicit numerical policy path
may be small. 
In light of these concerns, monetary policy committees may find it
difficult to reach consensus on a policy path, especially when they are
composed of a large number of members with diverse views on policy
objectives, models, and economic forecasts. This diversity of views may
be a strength of monetary policy committees that offsets some or all of
the benefits associated with forging a consensus on an explicit policy
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APPENDIX
To identify a future path for the policy rate, policymakers must fore-
cast their goal variables subject to fundamental economic developments,
including all possible paths for the policy rate. They then need to pick
the one path for the policy rate that best achieves their goals. Economic
theory provides a framework for describing how policymakers might
approach constructing such a policy path. 
Using a model of the economy, policymakers can determine a policy
path by optimizing an objective function, which defines the goals of
monetary policy and the preferences of policymakers when tradeoffs
exist among the goals. The standard model is typically forward looking
in the sense that expectations of the future affect the economy today;
agents are rational in the sense that they form expectations based on full
information including knowledge of the model itself; and prices adjust
gradually to supply and demand shocks. In such a model, monetary
policy not only determines the current policy rate, but also affects
longer-term rates through the public’s expectations of future policy
rates.
19 The more leverage a central bank has over the public’s expecta-
tion of future policy actions the greater the potential a central bank has
to influence longer-term rates in a way consistent with its goals.
Given such a model, policymakers might choose the policy path
that optimizes their objectives expressed in the form of an explicit loss
function. Policymakers would then minimize the loss function. One
such loss function, L, takes the following form: 
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where β is the rate at which policymakers discount the future, (πt+i–π*)
is the deviation of inflation, πt+i, from the inflation objective, π*; (yt+i –
yt+i*) is the deviation of output, yt+i, from its potential rate, yt+i*; and (rt+i
– rt+i–1) is the change over time in the policy interest rate, rt+i. The param-
eters λ and α represent the willingness of policymakers to trade off their
objectives for inflation, output, and interest rate stability. The higher λ
the more willing policymakers are to tolerate inflation and interest rate
volatility to achieve greater output stability. Similarly, the higher α the
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assumes that policymakers choose the path for rt that minimizes the
variation in inflation around their inflation objective, in output around
the potential rate of output, and in the level of the policy interest rate
over time—recognizing that stabilizing one variable may come at the
expense of stabilizing another. 
The timeframe, T, over which policymakers would formulate a
path for the policy rate would need to be long enough to allow the
economy to return to its long-run equilibrium if a shock took inflation
or output away from their objectives. This timeframe would likely
extend to several years because of the persistence of inflation and output
after an economic shock.
Economists have proposed a number of rules that characterize mon-
etary policy in recent years and that are calibrated to approximate the
outcome from minimization of the policymakers’ loss function. One
such rule takes the following form:
rt =  a(rt-1) + (1–a)[(r* + πt)+ b(πt - π*) + c(yt – yt*)] + ut,
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate so that (r*+πt) is the equi-
librium nominal interest rate; and ut is a zero mean, finite variance
disturbance term. The central bank chooses parameters a, b, and c to
minimize the loss function subject to its model of the economy. Under
such a rule, the policy rate is increased if inflation exceeds target or if
output rises above potential. The policy rate is lowered if inflation falls
below target or output falls below potential. The parameter a identifies
the weight between zero and one that the central bank places on
smoothing the policy interest rate over time. A value of 0 indicates no
interest rate smoothing, while a value of a greater than 0 indicates the
central bank deviates from the policy recommendation of a simple
Taylor-type rule to smooth the policy rate over time. 
The disturbance term, ut, represents the discretionary component of
monetary policy. Except for this component, policymakers respond sys-
tematically to incoming information about output and inflation. The
disturbance term represents a way to model instances where policymak-
ers might deviate from their systematic approach to policy to address
unusual circumstances such as a financial crisis.48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1A term premium is the extra compensation required for an investor to pur-
chase a long-term security rather than a series of short-term securities.  
2This analysis assumes the term premiums remain unchanged. See Sellon for
an extended discussion of the relationship between the policy path and the term
structure of interest rates. 
3Sellon computes the financial market’s expected policy path based on the
U.S. Treasury yield curve for three historical periods.
4Policymakers may also want to minimize financial market volatility by
smoothing changes in the policy rate over time. In this case, the objective function
would penalize changes in the policy rate.
5To the extent policymakers’ objective function also reflects a desire to
smooth changes in the policy rate over time, policymakers would also need to
communicate how willing they are to trade off their inflation and output objec-
tives to achieve greater stability in the policy rate. In addition, policymakers might
also have to indicate their willingness to trade off achievement of their objectives
today relative to the future and their views about key exogenous variables such as
fiscal policy.    
6As discussed later, the difficulty of backing away from an announced policy
path when economic conditions change unexpectedly is also one reason given for
not announcing an explicit policy path.
7Greater policy potency associated with a credible and persistent policy path
may also help policymakers address deflationary shocks in a low interest rate envi-
ronment (Woodford 1999).
8The advantages of a central bank formulating and communicating an
explicit policy path are also discussed in Faust and Leeper.
9Charles Freedman, then Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, provides
an example from the spring of 1998 in which the Bank of Canada provided guid-
ance about future policy in the form of a conditional statement. Financial market
participants apparently interpreted the statement as an unconditional commit-
ment and felt misled when the bank later altered course in light of changing eco-
nomic circumstances.
10For example, in 1999, the Federal Open Market Committee’s first experi-
ence with including forward-looking language about policy in its post-FOMC
meeting statements was viewed as having caused confusion in financial markets
(Rudebusch and Williams, pp. 5-6). 
11Another potential drawback of providing more explicit information to the
public about the policy path is the possibility that the private sector will become
less willing to acquire information on its own, which could reduce welfare (Mor-
ris and Shin). However, Svensson (2005a) argues this result applies only in very
special circumstances.
12The central banks of Colombia and the Czech Republic also assume an
endogenous policy path (Paulin; Central Bank of Colombia). In addition, Swe-
den’s Riksbank has recently announced its intention to begin publishing an
explicit policy path (Rosenberg).
13The ECB’s projections are the staff’s, not the Governing Council’s. The Bank
of England also presents alternative projections based on a constant policy rate. 
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14Financial markets may glean some of this information from members’ pub-
lic statements and voting records.
15The statement of the policy bias appeared in the FOMC’s directive to the
Open Market desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York beginning in 1983.
However, until May 1999, this information was made public only after the next
FOMC meeting, considerably reducing its information value to the market. For a
detailed discussion of the evolution of forward-looking language in the FOMC
statements, see Rudebusch and Williams. See also Thornton and Wheelock.
16In the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Minister of Finance
and the Governor of the Reserve Bank together agree on the specific target for
achieving and maintaining price stability.
17Blinder also provides a “typology” of monetary policy committees—from
individualistic to differing degrees of collegiality. 
18Svensson (2005b) advocates formulating and announcing the policy path
and suggests a voting procedure. Mishkin and Goodhart argue against having a
policy committee establish an explicit policy path.
19Such a model is known in the economics literature as a new Keynesian gen-
eral equilibrium model. See Woodford (2003) for an example of such a model.
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